China threat prompts Japan to rethink its security

Alexander Görlach writes about democracies in East Asia. He teaches democratic theory at New York University.
Japan’s foreign and security policy orbit sits far from Europe’s east, with Tokyo around 8,200 kilometers from Kyiv as the crow flies. And yet, Japan has supported Ukraine since it was attacked by Russia more than two years ago. In mid-June this year, Tokyo pledged its support even more concretely, as part of a 10-year security agreement worth $4.5 billion, signed by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the sidelines of the G7.
But beyond aid to Ukraine, Japan now stands determined to be recognized as an important part of the transatlantic and European security architecture. The example that best illustrates this is perhaps Kishida’s visit to Kyiv in March 2023, with the Japanese leader’s presence intended to signal — both to Moscow and its main partner China — that his country would abandon the neutral stance it adopted after World War II.
From Tokyo’s perspective, the Ukraine war has called Asia’s security architecture into question. As a result, it’s not only Japan but also countries like South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines that are strengthening their alliances with each other and the U.S. And in return for its commitment to Europe, Tokyo now wants the support of the free world in the event of a Chinese attack on democratic Taiwan.
As it stands, Putin supports his counterpart in the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in the belief that Taiwan is part of China and, if necessary, must be “reunified” with the motherland by force of arms. Furthermore, unlike his predecessors, Xi has made it clear he wants to resolve the “Taiwan issue” during his rule and bring the island under his control.
Japan, for its part, is a close ally of the small island nation. Though the Japanese Empire took control of Taiwan and colonized it, the colonial power there acted differently than it did in South Korea and China, where it committed horrific crimes. Since post-war Japan hasn’t clearly distanced itself from these racist crimes, relations with Seoul and Beijing remain tense. Yet, in Taiwan, where the locals didn’t end up being killed en masse, people today speak warmly of Japan.
Furthermore, there’s no war scenario in which Japan wouldn’t be affected by China’s aggression against Taiwan. Not only is it very closely situated to the island nation, there are also around 54,000 American soldiers stationed in Japan, many of them on the island of Okinawa. And Washington has repeatedly declared it will support Taiwan militarily should Xi attack. In addition, half of the world’s container traffic plies the Taiwan Strait — the sea route that separates Taiwan and China.
So, Japan is now calling on Europe, not least in its own interests, to prepare for a potential conflict.
Of course, such a conflict wouldn’t necessarily have to be in the form of a military offensive from Beijing. If China were to prevent the movement of goods into and out of Taiwan with a naval blockade, for example, it would impact the global economy. It would also interrupt the production of important semiconductors in Taiwan, as the island state only has two weeks’ worth of energy reserves. Affecting the production of cars, refrigerators, cell phones and military goods, this would result in immediate negative consequences for Europe and the U.S. as well.
In the face of this threat, Japan isn’t only looking to Europe, however. It’s also trying to position itself in regional constellations. In the recent past, Japan has held trilateral meetings with Korea and the U.S. on the one hand, and Korea and China on the other. It is also part of the Quad, an Indo-Pacific security initiative along with India, the U.S. and Australia.
Additionally, Tokyo maintains a “maritime dialogue” with Manila, as the Philippines are under constant threat from China, with Beijing wanting to control parts of the West Philippine Sea. As a direct neighbor of Taiwan, Manila fears an attack on the small island by the Chinese army could ignite a conflagration as well.
These “mini laterals” — i.e. loose alliances between states based on acute common interests are the new format in East Asia. The U.S. is adapting to this new approach too, as it promises flexibility at a time when Russia and China could torpedo a joint global approach whenever they wanted with their veto right in the U.N. Security Council.
Washington also seems to have realized cooperation will not only be key in the 21st century, but that local actors may be better placed to contain and successfully deter a regional threat. There is, therefore, almost no country in Asia where the U.S. Army hasn’t offered security training or other services to its partners in recent years. Moreover, the sharing of military technology — such as in the AUKUS pact with Australia and the U.K. — demonstrates America’s willingness to follow this new mini-lateral approach.
This could also indicate the route Washington’s looking to pursue with its partners in Europe. And if that’s the case, Europe should indeed prepare to establish a stronger regional force with self-defense capabilities, regardless of who wins the White House in November.
Japan is now prepared to take on a prominent role in this new security mix. The first step will be for Tokyo to build trust with neighbors, and if this succeeds, an “Asian NATO” could well emerge from these mini laterals — though it would likely look very different to its transatlantic counterpart. European partners, on the other hand, should start training their eyes on the Far East, and take Japan’s commitment to Ukraine as inspiration for their possible commitment to democratic Taiwan.